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MUTING THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE:
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE STATE
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK V. FOX
109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989)
The commercial speech doctrine provides significant first amend-
ment protection' to speech that proposes a commercial transaction.2
Before this doctrine's inception, commercial speech enjoyed no refuge
from government regulation.3 The commercial speech doctrine pro-
vides a mechanism for balancing the public benefit from the free flow of
information4 with the state's interest in regulating business.' As the
doctrine developed, it increasingly curtailed the government's ability to
regulate commercial speech.6 Restrictions were allowed to extend no
1. Although the doctrine provides significant protection, courts recognize its limited
nature. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (characterizing
commercial speech's protection as limited, commensurate with its subordinate position
in the scale of first amendment values).
2. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,
340 (1986) (defining commercial speech as that which does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction").
3. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942) (refusing to extend first
amendment protection to advertising). But see Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S.
498 (1959). In Cammarano, the Court stated: "The [Valentine] ruling was casual, al-
most offhand. And it has not survived reflection." Id at 514. See generally Comment,
The First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech and State Regulation of Adver-
tising in the Dental Profession: Parker v. Kentucky Board of Dentistry, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1525 (1988) (overview of commercial speech development).
4. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976) ("It is a matter of public interest that [private economic] decisions,
in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed."). See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948) (discussing the need
for the free flow of information in a representative democracy).
5. See Virginia State Bda, 425 U.S. at 770 (noting that the first amendment controls
in balancing the dangers of suppressing information with the dangers of its misuse if
freely available). See also D. ROHRER, MASS MEDIA, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND AD-
VERTISING 75-80 (1979) (tracing the development of the commercial speech doctrine).
See generally J. NoWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 923-43
(2d ed. 1983).
6. See Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 774 (noting that a state may not suppress the
flow of truthful information out of fear of that information's effect on its recipients).
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further than necessary to advance the state's regulatory interests.7 In
Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,' however,
the Supreme Court retreated from previous formulations of the doc-
trine by choosing not to impose a least restrictive means requirement
on commercial speech regulations.'
In Fox, the State University of New York (SUNY) prohibited ven-
dors from demonstrating their products in campus dormitory rooms.'0
Several students sued for a declaratory judgment that such action de-
prived merchants and students of their first amendment rights.11 After
granting a preliminary injunction,12 the district court held for SUNY
and declared the speech restrictions reasonable in light of a dormitory's
function.13 The Second Circuit reversed on appeal"4 and remanded the
7. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (invalidating the state's complete suppression of commercial speech when nar-
rower restrictions on expression would adequately serve the state's interest).
8. 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989).
9. Id. at 3033.
10. Id. at 3030. SUNY Resolution 66-156 (1979) states: "No authorization will be
given to private commercial enterprises to operate on State University campuses or in
facilities furnished by the University other than to provide for food, legal beverages,
campus bookstore, vending, linen supply, laundry, dry cleaning, banking, barber and
beautician services and cultural events." Id A representative of American Future Sys-
tems, Inc. (AFS) conducted a demonstration of the company's products in a dorm room
at SUNY's Cortland campus. Campus police informed the representative of the resolu-
tion and asked her to leave. When she refused, police arrested her. Subsequently, Todd
Fox agreed to host an AFS presentation in his dormitory room. The Director of Resi-
dential Life at SUNY-Cortland denied Fox permission and stated that the university
would take legal action if any demonstrations were held. Bd. of Trustees of State Univ.
of N.Y. v. Fox, 649 F. Supp. 1393, 1395 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
11. Fox, 649 F. Supp. at 1395. AFS, its representative Kathy Rapp and Todd Fox
filed suit December 2, 1982. Id. Several other students joined as plaintiffs later. Id. at
1397.
12. American Future Sys., Inc. v. State Univ. of N.Y., 565 F. Supp. 754, 770
(N.D.N.Y. 1983). The district court enjoined the prohibition of AFS from demonstrat-
ing its products in the dormitory rooms of SUNY-Cortland students. The court re-
fused, however, to enjoin SUNY from prohibiting the actual sale of AFS products,
reasoning that the claim of a constitutional right to consummate transactions did not
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. In addition, the court stated that
nothing in its injunction order restrained SUNY from promulgating and enforcing rea-
sonable regulations governing the time, place and manner of such demonstrations. Id.
at 771.
13. Fox, 649 F. Supp. at 1399. The district court recognized that SUNY's interest
in protecting students from commercial exploitation was not the motivation for the
regulations. Accordingly, the court's ruling rested on the public forum doctrine. The
court upheld the resolution on public forum grounds, citing strong support. Id. See
also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985) (holding
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case for determination as to whether SUNY could impose less restric-
tive means to advance its interest.15 The Supreme Court reversed the
Second Circuit, holding that commercial speech regulations may ex-
tend beyond the least restrictive means necessary to advance the gov-
ernment's interest.16
The Supreme Court first brought commercial speech within the
bounds of the first amendment"7 in Bigelow v. Virginia. " In Bigelow,
the Court invalidated a state statute prohibiting abortion advertising.19
The Court renounced the view that the first amendment does not afford
constitutional protection to commercial speech2" but did not determine
that a decision to restrict access of a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable); Glover
v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding a university prohibition of on-campus
sales and fund raising activities by groups not sponsored by students or the college);
Chapman v. Thomas, 743 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding a university prohibition
on door-to-door solicitation in dormitories).
14. Fox v. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y., 841 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir
1988). Before the district court's ruling, Kathy Rapp dropped out of the suit. AFS
dropped out prior to the appeal. Accordingly, the court focused only on the students'
first amendment claim of the right to receive information. Id. at 1208.
15. Id at 1214. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (striking down a commercial speech regulation because a more limited restric-
tion would adequately serve the government's interest). But see American Future Sys.,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 866 (3d Cir. 1984) (concluding that a
court may not substitute its own judgment for the University's decision as to the best
means to carry out its legitimate ends).
16. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033 (1989).
17. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1527 (discussing the development of the com-
mercial speech doctrine in relation to the regulation of professional advertising).
18. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
19. Id. at 829. The Virginia statute provided:
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of
any publication, or in any other manner, encourage[s] or prompt[s] the procuring
of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960). Bigelow, the managing editor of a Charlottesville,
Virginia newspaper, published an ad for a New York City organization announcing that
it would arrange low cost abortions for women in accredited New York hospitals. Bige-
low, 421 U.S. at 811-12. The trial court found Bigelow in violation of the statute. Id. at
812-13. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, rejecting Bigelow's first amendment
claim, holding that the state may constitutionally prohibit commercial advertising. Id.
at 814. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 829.
20. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1527. The Court distinguished a prior holding as
limited to its particular facts. The Court stated that the ordinance upheld in that case
regulated the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed. The Court
renounced the view that the case supports a sweeping proposition that advertising re-
ceives no constitutional protection. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819-20. See also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (concluding that speech does not lose
1990]
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the extent of its constitutional protection.2
The Court made that determination one year later2 in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.23 In Vir-
ginia State Board, a consumer group successfully challenged a state law
prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices.24
The Court criticized the state's paternalistic method of protecting its
citizens by keeping them ignorant.2 5 Noting that well-informed deci-
sions require open channels of communication,26 the Court concluded
that the public's right to the free flow of information outweighed the
state's regulatory interests.27
The Supreme Court expanded upon this balancing of interests in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New
York,2" when it established a four-part constitutional test for commer-
first amendment protection merely because it appears as a cQmmercial advertisement);
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966) (noting that the existence of com-
mercial activity, in itself, does not justify narrowing the protection of expression secured
by the first amendment).
21. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825. The Court limited its holding to the determination
that the Virginia courts erred in their assumption that advertising deserves no first
amendment protection. Id. The Court withheld comment on previous decisions con-
cerning the regulation of advertising in readily distinguishable fact situations. Id. at 825
n.10.
22. See Fisher, The Constitutionality of the Food and Drug Administration's Regula-
tion of Over-the-Counter Drug Labeling under the Commercial Free Speech Doctrine, 40
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 188, 201 (1985) (discussing the commercial speech doctrine's
impact on the marketing of pharmaceuticals).
23. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
24. Id at 770. The Virginia statute provided that charges of unprofessional conduct
may be brought against a licensed pharmacist who publishes, advertises or promotes
any amount, price, fee, premium or discount for any drugs which may be dispensed only
by prescription. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974). Two nonprofit organizations
challenged the statute, claiming that the public would benefit if the prohibition were
lifted and advertising allowed. They argued that the first amendment entitles prescrip-
tion drug users to receive information concerning the price of drugs. Virginia State Bd.,
425 U.S. at 753-54.
25. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 770.
26. Id. at 765. The Court stated that the allocation of resources in a free enterprise
economy comes largely through private economic decisions. The public interest in
those decisions being intelligent and well informed commands the free flow of commer-
cial information. Id. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (extending first
amendment protection to purely factual matters of public interest).
27. Virginia State Bd, 425 U.S. at 770.
28. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Court stated that the protection available for a partic-
ular commercial expression turns on the nature of both the expression and the govern-
mental interests served by its regulation. Id. at 563. See Comment, supra note 3, at
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cial speech regulations First, to warrant first amendment protection
under the Central Hudson test, commercial speech must concern law-
ful activity and must not mislead the public.29 Second, the government
must assert a substantial public interest in order to regulate commer-
cial speech.3° Third, the regulation must directly advance that inter-
est.3 1 Finally, the regulation must not extend further than necessary to
serve that interest.32 Relying on this test, the Court lifted a restraint
on an electric utility's ability to advertise the use of electricity because
the prohibition was an overly broad attempt to promote conserva-
tion.33 The Court held that unless a more limited regulation proved
insufficient, the state could not suppress the utility's advertising.34
The Central Hudson test became the Supreme Court's standard for
examining commercial speech regulations. As such, two distinct meth-
ods of applying the test arose.3 5 The Court applied the test strictly in
cases where the government's interest concerned ensuring equitable
business transactions.3 6 Conversely, when the state's interest did not
1528 (discussing the Central Hudson test as a means of balancing the competing inter-
ests of state regulation and first amendment rights).
29. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. The Court reasoned that the informational
function of advertising forms the basis of the first amendment's concern for commercial
speech. Accordingly, the Constitution permits the suppression of commercial messages
which do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. Id.
30. Id. at 564.
31. Id. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977) (strik-
ing down a ban on "For Sale" signs in front of houses for lack of a direct connection
between the regulation and the city's goal of integrating housing).
32. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565. The Court declared that the state cannot
regulate speech which poses no danger to the asserted state interest, nor can it com-
pletely suppress information when narrower restrictions on expression would suffice.
Id. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (invalidating a
statute that prohibited speech in a manner unjustified by a compelling state interest).
33. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 572. The regulation at issue in Central Hudson
completely banned the utility from advertising to promote the use of electricity. Id. at
558. The Court found a direct connection between the regulation and the state's inter-
est in energy conservation. Id. at 569. Upon appellant's insistence that, but for the ban,
it would advertise products and services which use energy efficiently, the Court con-
cluded that the energy conservation rationale did not justify suppressing information
about electrical devices or services which do not cause an increase in energy use. Id. at
570.
34. Id. at 571.
35. See Comment, Posadas de Puerto Rico-v. Tourism Company: Rolling the Dice
with Central Hudson, 40 RUTGERS L. Rv. 241, 253 (1987) (discussing the Supreme
Court's inconsistent application of the Central Hudson test).
36. See, eg., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (struck
1990]
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relate to supervising commerce, the Court deferred to legislative deter-
mination of the regulation's proper scope.3 7
In In re R.MJ. 3 an example of the former type of regulation, the
Court required a state to show that the restriction on speech was no
broader than reasonably necessary to prevent deception. In re R.MJ.
involved an attorney who faced disbarment because his advertising de-
viated from the specific wording required by the state of Missouri.39
The Supreme Court struck down the regulation under the Central
Hudson test.4° The Court found that the state made no effort to ad-
vance its interests through a less restrictive means.41 The Court con-
cluded that restrictions should apply in a manner no more extensive
than reasonably necessary to further substantial interests.42
Similarly, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,43 the
Supreme Court invalidated a prohibition on the use of illustrations in
attorney advertising.'" The Court declared that the state bears the bur-
den of showing that its regulation facilitates a substantial state interest
down ban on illustrations in attorney advertising after Court determined that the regu-
lation extended further than necessary to accomplish the state's objective). See also
infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
37. See, eg., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality
opinion) (deference given to legislature's determination that prohibiting billboards
would eliminate traffic problems and improve city's appearance). See also infra notes
51-60 and accompanying text.
38. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
39. Id. at 197-98. An addendum to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4 specified
twenty-three areas of practice which attorneys may list in advertisements. An attorney
could not deviate from the precise wording stated in the rule to describe these areas. Id.
at 195. The appellant deviated from the prescribed language in his advertisement, list-
ing his areas of practice as "personal injury" and "real estate," rather than "tort law"
and "property law." He also included several areas of law without analogue in the list.
The Advisory Committee of the Missouri Supreme Court charged the appellant with
unprofessional conduct and subjected him to disbarment proceedings. Id. at 197.
40. Id. at 206-07.
41. Id. at 206. See Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari at 16, Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox (No. 87-2013), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 52 (1988). The Court doubted that the regulation provided the only manner
of advancing the state's interest in: supervising attorney advertising. The Court sug-
gested that requiring attorneys to file a copy of advertisements with the Advisory Com-
mittee would accomplish the state's objective without unreasonably restricting
commercial expression. 455 U.S. at 206.
42. R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 207.
43. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
44. Id. at 647. Zauderer placed an advertisement in 36 Ohio newspapers, targeting
women who had been injured. Id. at 630. The Disciplinary Counsel charged Zauderer
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/12
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through the least restrictive means.45 Furthermore, the Court noted
that deferring to the state would defeat the purpose of extending first
amendment protection to commercial speech.46
In contrast, when the government's regulatory interest does not con-
cern the integrity of a business transaction, the Supreme Court has
yielded to legislative determination. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego,47 for example, the City of San Diego prohibited outdoor adver-
tising displays in order to eliminate traffic hazards and improve the
city's appearance.48 A plurality of the Supreme Court accepted the
regulation as reaching no further than necessary to promote the city's
interests.4 9 After acknowledging the Central Hudson test as its guiding
principle, the plurality upheld the prohibition without inquiring
whether less restrictive means would have accomplished the city's
objective.50
with violating DR 2-101(B) of the Ohio Disciplinary Rules, which prohibits the use of
illustrations in attorney advertisements. Id. at 632.
45. Id. at 647. The Court stated that because the appellant's illustration contained
no features likely to deceive, mislead, or confuse the reader, the state must present a
substantial governmental interest to justify the restriction and to demonstrate that the
restriction advances that interest through the least restrictive available means. Id. See
Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17, Board of
Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox (No. 87-2013), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988).
46. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646. The Court stated that commercial speech's first
amendment protection would mean little if courts did not require the state to justify
their regulations. Id.
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988), the Supreme Court
struck down a ban on targeted solicitation of legal business. Id. at 1925. A Kentucky
Supreme Court Rule prohibited mailing or delivering written advertisements "precipi-
tated by a specific event or occurrence involving or related to the addressee or address-
ees as distinct from the general public." Id at 1919-20 n.2. The Court concluded that
the state failed to meet the Central Hudson criteria because the regulation did not em-
ploy the least restrictive means to achieve its end. Id. at 1923. The Court declared that
merely because targeted, direct mail solicitation presents lawyers with opportunities for
abuses, that does not justify a ban on protected commercial speech. Id.
47. 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion).
48. Id. at 493. The California Supreme Court defined the term "advertising display
sign" as a rigidly assembled sign, display, or device permanently affixed to the ground
or permanently attached to a building or other permanent structure used for the display
of a commercial or other advertisement to the public. Id. The city permitted a few
exceptions, including allowing companies to advertise with signs on their own site. Id.
at 508.
49. Id.
50. Id. The plurality declared that if the city has a sufficient basis for believing that
billboards constitute traffic hazards, their prohibition may be the most direct, and per-
haps the only effective approach to solving the problems they'create. The plurality did
1990]
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The Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson test deferentially
again in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico.51 In Posadas, the Court upheld a statute regulating the advertise-
ment of casino gambling.52 The law sought to prevent Puerto Rican
citizens from gambling by prohibiting casinos from advertising their
facilities to local residents.53 The Court did not question whether the
government could better accomplish its goal by broadly discouraging
gambling, rather than suppressing speech which might encourage it.54
Accordingly, the Court deferred to the legislature to determine the
scope of its regulation.55 The Court's deference to such audience-spe-
cific restrictions formed the basis for the Court's later rejection of a
least restrictive means analysis.56
Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox57
presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify its applica-
tion of the Central Hudson test. The Court held that the first amend-
ment does not require commercial speech regulations to satisfy a least
restrictive means test. 58 As such, the Court's ruling precludes first
amendment challenges based solely upon claims that less restrictive
not discuss any less restrictive alternatives which could have advanced the city's objec-
tive, such as size or place limitations for billboards. Id. The separate concurrence
would have decided the case without regard to the commercial/noncommercial speech
dichotomy in first amendment analysis. Id at 522.
51. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
52. Id. at 344.
53. Id. at 333.
54. Id. at 344.
55. Id. The Court stated that the legislature could conclude that residents of Puerto
Rico already know the risks of gambling. Nevertheless, widespread advertising might
induce them to engage in potentially harmful conduct. Id. See Dunagin v. City of
Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983). In Dunagin, the court upheld a restriction on
alcohol advertising. The state acknowledged the public's awareness of the dangers of
alcohol. The state's regulatory concern was that advertising would promote alcohol
consumption despite its known dangers. 718 F.2d at 751.
56. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (Justice Scalia's support for the
Fox rationale).
Justice Stevens, in dissent, found the Posadas Court's deference shocking, and argued
that the first amendment clearly forbids the regulation. 478 U.S. at 358.
At least one commentator finds the Posadas Court's justification for such audience-
specific regulation unsettling, arguing that little separates audience-specific regulation
from content-specific bans. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrrIIONAL LAW 903-04 (2d
ed. 1988).
57. 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989).
58. Id. at 3033.
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means could equally advance the government's interest. 59
The Court argued that support for a least restrictive means require-
ment in prior cases was dicta." Based on such a characterization of
prior cases as merely dicta, the Court stated that it confronted the spe-
cific issue for the first time. 61 The Court then criticized least restrictive
means analysis on two grounds. First, the Court recognized that com-
mercial speech receives less first amendment protection than noncom-
mercial speech. 62 Thus, the Court considered a least restrictive means
requirement to be incompatible with the subordinate position of com-
mercial speech in the scale of first amendment protection.63
Second, the Court could not reconcile a least restrictive means anal-
ysis with prior decisions, uphholding commercial speech regulation,
such as Posadas." The Court stated that its prior decisions required
only a reasonable "fit" between the governmental concern and the
means chosen to advance that interest. 65 The Court concluded that
governmental bodies have inside powers and need not create a perfect
"fit" as long as the regulation is "narrowly tailored." 6
6
The dissent criticized the Court's passing treatment of formulations
in prior cases which support a least restrictive means requirement.67
The dissent considered a least restrictive means analysis integral to pre-
vious decisions invalidating restraints on commercial speech.6 8
59. Id. at 3035. The Court emphasized the difficulty of establishing the precise
point at which restrictions become more extensive than necessary. Rejecting a least
restrictive means standard, it held, provides legislatures with needed leeway in design-
ing regulations. Id.
60. Id. at 3032-33.
61. Id. at 3033.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 3034.
64. Id. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. See also San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (upholding statute
prohibiting the use of the word "Olympic" to promote activities unrelated to the U.S.
Olympic Committee).
65. 109 S. Ct. at 3035.
66. Id. Additionally, the Court noted that its reasonable fit of means to ends analy-
sis is distinct from "rational basis" analysis under the fourteenth amendment. Id.
67. Id. at 3038 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). The dissent considered it unnecessary to
discuss the commercial speech issue in this case. The dissent argued that the case
should have been disposed of on a narrower alternate theory based on overbreadth anal-
ysis. Id.
68. Id. at 3038 n.l. The dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's characteriza-
tion of the language in prior cases as dicta. Id. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
1990]
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Because it failed to impose a least restrictive means requirement on
any commercial speech regulations,69 the Fox decision seriously under-
mines the commercial speech doctrine.70 The Court correctly noted
that commercial speech receives more limited first amendment protec-
tion than political speech.7 1 The Court erred, however, in failing to
acknowledge that the government's regulatory interest should be the
determinative factor in the Central Hudson test.72
The Court ignored differences in the motivation behind commercial
speech regulations. 73 In Fox, SUNY's interest was in maintaining dor-
mitories for their intended purpose rather than regulating business
transactions.74 Permitting SUNY to balance that interest against the
students' desire to receive information did not contravene the funda-
mental spirit of the commercial speech doctrine.75 By failing to ac-
knowledge the importance of SUNY's motive, however, the Supreme
Court left its decision open to broad application and thereby implicitly
granted approval for paternalistic business regulations. 76
The Supreme Court's Central Hudson test established a realistic
method for balancing advertisers' free speech interests against the gov-
ernment's concern with regulating business. 77 Unless courts specifi-
cally examine a challenged regulation, however, the Central Hudson
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985) (concluding that the state must advance its interest
through the least restrictive available means).
69. 109 S. Ct. at 3030-36.
70. See Wall St. J., June 30, 1989, at B6, col. 2. (decrying the Fox decision's limita-
tion of first amendment protection for advertising).
71. 109 S. Ct. at 3033.
72. See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text (discussing commercial speech
review based on regulatory motive).
73. See Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3030-35.
74. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 649 F. Supp. 1393, 1399
(N.D.N.Y. 1986).
75. The Supreme Court viewed the commercial speech doctrine as a way to liberate
information and to promote public self-determination. Fisher, supra note 24, at 202.
"The doctrine values personal decision making over paternalism, and public disclosure
over government enforced ignorance." Id.
76. Opening the channels of communication presents a better alternative to pater-
nalism. Given the free flow of information, people will perceive their own best interests.
The first amendment dictates that the state may not suppress information, for fear of its
danger. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
77. Comment, supra note 3, at 1536.
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test has no impact.78  If courts defer to the judgment of local
lawmakers without scrutinizing the justifications for a particular regu-
lation, the state may satisfy the test any time it claims a substantial
interest.79 As noted in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,80
such a policy contradicts the purpose of the commercial speech
doctrine." '
The Fox decision disadvantages both advertisers and the public.
Free speech values encourage the exchange of information, which al-
lows better informed individual choice.8 2 The Supreme Court based
the commercial speech doctrine on the benefits of increased public in-
formation in the marketplace."3 The government's regulatory interest
should not infringe needlessly upon the public's access to informa-
tion."4 The Supreme Court should impose a least restrictive means re-
quirement on paternalistic commercial speech regulations designed to
supervise the exchange of information. 5
By refusing to impose a least restrictive means requirement on any
commercial speech regulations, the Supreme Court hinders constitu-
tional challenges against restrictions which go beyond their objective.
The Court's decision represents a step backwards from the earlier de-
velopment of the commercial speech doctrine and will undoubtedly
hinder the free flow of important consumer information.
David Rownd*
78. Curtis, Advertising Regulated Products, 2 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 621, 636-37
(1985).
79. Id. at 637.
80. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
81. Id. at 647.
82. L. TRIBE, supra note 60, at 894. "Commercial speech is not political speech,
and cannot claim the same historical or philosophic purposes; but it is speech. Its cen-
sorship has political as well as economic costs." Id.
83. See supra note 4 for two illustrative Supreme Court cases.
84. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
85. Id.
* J.D. 1991, Washington University
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/12
